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Presented herein is hardware fingerprinting technology that provides the ability to 
detect tampered hardware using a trust anchor. During manufacturing of networking equipment 
(e.g., routers, switches, etc.), a manufacturer fingerprints the critical hardware elements of a 
platform/system, such as Central Processing Units (CPUs) and/or Application-Specific 
Integrated Circuits (ASICs). The fingerprint is stored in the tamper resistant trust anchor. This 
fingerprint is then examined at every power cycle (and possibly on-demand) to determine 
whether a critical component has been replaced. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Networking equipment (e.g., routers, switches, etc.) may be susceptible to security 
threats when shipping from the network equipment vendor/manufacturer and is en route to a 
customer/user. For example, there is some apprehension that entities may replace Central 
Processing Units (CPUs) and/or Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) with 
CPUs/ASICs containing Trojans and/or malware. There is concern that vendors of CPUs/ASICs 
may be influenced to put Trojans into chips, or to insert Trojans in the form of an added die in a 
package assembly. 
Attacks on supply chains may involve replacing CPUs, ASICs, Systems-on-Chips 
(SoCs), etc. with chips containing Trojan/malware while the products (e.g., networking 
equipment) are en route to customers. Security research has shown that chip vendors can be 
influenced to put Trojans into chips, or to insert Trojans in form of an added die in package 
assembly. Chip guard techniques are described herein to mitigate these threats using unique 
device identifiers built and stored inside the Trust Anchor Module (TAM) of a device to identify 
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and track components through the life cycle of the product. Therefore, chip guard techniques 
may be used to ensure secure asset transfer in the product manufacturing and distribution cycle. 
The following description is made with reference to FIGs. 1 and 2.  FIG. 1 illustrates a 
conceptual flow of a manufacturing process to create an Imprint Database (ImprintDB) for chip 
guard initialization, according to an example embodiment. FIG. 2 illustrates a conceptual flow of 
a runtime validation process using an Observed Database (ObservedDB) for a chip guard 
mechanism used for device validation, according to an example embodiment. 
To mitigate the threat of Trojans/malware added to products en route to the user, 
unique identifiers buried inside chips may be used to identify and track components through the 
lifecycle of the products. This solution is attractive because it is primarily firmware-based. 
Harvesting unique identifiers through a Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) interface may be 
untenable because of some vendors’ reluctance to share unique identifiers through such a 
physical interface. There are also concerns regarding overloading that interface with other 
functional uses. Many CPUs and ASICs expose unique identifiers through memory mapped 
register interfaces. Spoofing Peripheral Component Interconnect express (PCIe) (the default bus 
in current compute resources) memory mapped interfaces using a Trojan module is difficult (e.g., 
switching a PCIe endpoint with intelligence to swap for a particular memory mapped access). 
Thus, chip guard techniques described herein may be used to verify a device manifest 
to counter chip replacement attacks. Embedded products may implement insertion of a device 
identifier (e.g., Secure Unique Device Identifier (SUDI)) after assembly is complete. Diagnostic 
software in conjunction with an automated testing infrastructure may accomplish this task. Once 
the SUDI is installed on a product, diagnostic software may take additional steps. The diagnostic 
software may query all previously identified critical components (e.g., CPUs, SoCs, ASICs, etc.) 
for unique identifiers, collect associated information, and provide that information to the TAM 
using the manufacturing user session. This process may be referred to as “imprinting.” The 
imprint is taken during manufacturing and stored in an Imprint Database (ImprintDB) in the 
TAM as a Known Good Value (KGV). ImprintDB is a master copy that stores the unique 
identifiers of ASICs, CPUs, SoCs and other devices with their device types specific to a board. 
In most cases, the unique identifier is device serial number or appropriate value of that device. 
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The ImprintDB is a KGV database specific to a board. It is programmed on the TAM device as 
part of the manufacturing process. 
As the system powers up, various software entities perform the task of system 
initialization. During system initialization, the driver responsible for configuring the chip may be 
responsible for collecting unique identifiers and providing them to the TAM. This process may 
be referred to as “observing.” Measurements taken at each boot time may be stored in an 
Observed Database (ObservedDB) in the TAM. Before the system transitions to the operating 
state (handling user data), a query may be made to the TAM to determine whether the 
ObservedDB matches the ImprintDB. If the value does not match, the Operating System (OS) 
boot may be halted as the unmatched value indicates that the chip is compromised. The 
ObservedDB is collected by firmware every time the board is booted and extended to the TAM
device. If some measurements are unavailable through firmware, those may be collected 
immediately after the available measurements from OS drivers. 
The Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) boot process integrates the TAM library to 
populate the ObservedDB. The BIOS detects various hardware components as part of 
initialization and uses the TAM library Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to record the 
device type and unique identifiers if the detected devices are part of ImprintDB collection. Once 
all the device types and unique identifiers are written to the ObservedDB, the platform OS 
invokes the TAM library API to validate the ObservedDB against the ImprintDB. If there is a 
mismatch, the platform may take appropriate action, such as alarming (e.g., printing out an 
error/warning message with a pre-defined error code), error logging, holding the boot process, 
encouraging the user to call customer support, etc. This capability may be built into the TAM 
with supported TAM service library APIs and/or Command Line Interface (CLI) commands. 
While these systems are deployed, an operator may challenge the system with a nonce at 
any time and send a demand to the system identity databases (ImprintDB and ObservedDB). The 
TAM may return all databases to the operator with a signed response to the nonce including an 
ImprintDB hash and ObservedDB hash. The TAM may use an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) 
for such signing and present an AIK certificate in response to the command as well. 
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The chip guard feature may be implemented on multiple Field Replaceable Units (FRUs) 
of a given platform where there is a TAM device present, regardless of whether a CPU is 
present. Any FRU containing critical components (ASICs, Network Processor Units (NPUs), 
CPUs, etc.) may have its own trust anchor where unique values can be imprinted in 
manufacturing. TAM service may support attestation on the ObservedDB such that chip 
measurements may be attested by a remote attestation server and/or CLI commands. 
System configuration may impact system identity, depending on the particular 
configuration. When the system has a fixed set of critical components, multiple compute and 
trust anchors within a fixed system (e.g., a system with an x86 compute and Baseboard 
Management Controller (BMC) based infrastructure) may create complications. Such products 
may support multiple TAMs and, in turn, each TAM may include a distinct ImprintDB based on 
the connectivity of its host CPU.  
Meanwhile, modular systems (e.g., having many embedded boxes) may use “dumb” 
linecards and an intelligent Route Processor / Service Processor (RP/SP). A modular system may 
have linecards with ASICs or, in some instances, linecards with compute elements and ASICs. 
Each linecard may have its own TAM. In cases involving linecards with the TAM and the CPU 
complex, the linecard itself may contain its own system identity. In cases involving linecards 
containing ASICs but not a compute element, the TAM of the linecard(s) may have the system 
identity information imprinted thereon. Additionally/alternatively, comparison logic may run on 
the host system (along with an anti-counterfeit check). For a TAM, comparison logic may exist 
on the TAM device itself, except that observation may be performed by host software on the 
TAM on such a linecard. At a system level, a composite system identity response may be 
generated. 
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a network node (e.g., switch, router, etc.) that is configured 
to perform operations described herein. The network node includes a network interface unit in 
the form of a plurality of network ports that enable communications over a network, an 
Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) that performs network processing functions, one 
or more processors (e.g., microprocessors or microcontrollers), and a memory. The memory 
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includes instructions for security verification logic as well as a TAM. As shown, the TAM 
includes an ImprintDB and an ObservedDB. 
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